

The Anthropological and Social Purpose of Psychoanalysis

La funzione antropologica e sociale della psicoanalisi

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Riassunto

Silvia Montefoschi pensava la psicoanalisi come strumento per una rivoluzione socio-economica. Essendo una scienza umanistica che apprende dall'essere umano, agendo su e con altri esseri umani, non può essere cieca al sistema politico ed economico in cui sia analista che paziente stanno vivendo. Anche se tipicamente il contesto sociale ed economico sono presi in considerazioni per il singolo paziente, questi due contesti non sono mai stati analizzati in una visione teorica più ampia. Questa potrebbe fornire uno strumento filosofico per riflettere sui condizionamenti impliciti ai quali sono stati assoggettati i pazienti nel capitalismo occidentale contemporaneo e sugli effetti che potrebbe avere sulle relazioni oggettuali. Freud stesso utilizzò concetti economici e politici nella creazione del suo primo modello della mente umana: l'*homo oeconomicus*. È interessante notare come il sistema psichico da lui teorizzato si sarebbe concluso nell'entropia se l'uomo non fosse nel suo ambiente sociale, che è causa di conflitti, ma lo porta a sviluppare il principio di realtà. Tramite il pensiero Marxista, il percorso sociale che l'*homo oeconomicus* ha affrontato per arrivare al capitalismo occidentale moderno (e non più esclusivamente occidentale), diventa più chiaro. Le complesse interdipendenze volute e causate da una società capitalistica sono terreno fertile dal quale derivano i problemi relazionali contemporanei dell'oggettificazione, la mancanza di empatia e le loro conseguenze.

Parole chiave: *psicoanalisi; filosofia; teoria psicoanalitica; psicoanalisi intersoggettiva; Silvia Montefoschi.*

Abstract

Silvia Montefoschi thought of psychoanalysis as a tool for a socio-economic revolution. Being a humanistic science which learns from, operates on, and operates with other human beings, it cannot be blind to the political and financial system the patient and the analyst are living in. Although typically the political and economic contexts have been taken into account for the single patient, they haven't been analyzed on a broader theoretical scale. This broader perspective could provide clinicians and researchers with a philosophical tool to reflect on the implicit conditioning patients have been subjected to in contemporary "western" capitalism, and the effects it has on object relations. Sigmund Freud himself used economics and politics during the creation of his first model of the human mind, the *homo oeconomicus*. It is also interesting to note that the psychic system he theorized would conclude itself in entropy if man did not enter into the social environment, cause of conflicts, developing the reality principle. Through Marxist thought, the social path the *homo oeconomicus* took towards contemporary western (and not so western anymore) capitalism, becomes clearer. The complex interdependence wanted and caused by a capitalistic society is the fertile ground from which contemporary human relational problems such as objectification, lack of empathy, and their consequences, stem.

Key words: *psychoanalysis; philosophy; psychoanalytic theory; intersubjective psychoanalysis; Silvia Montefoschi.*

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“... Life of human beings is seen in a sectorial way, which is blind towards the connections between the social environment and the individual. [...] The use of the objectifying method in relation to the social environment can be seen as a result and presupposition for the contemporary system of socio-economic relationships. (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 125)

Psychoanalysis is a tool for social revolution¹. Being a humanistic science (*Geisteswissenschaft*) tied to the discipline of philosophy², which studies and works with the human mind, it cannot be separated from those factors which condition the individual and his social environment: politics, philosophy³, and economics. It is fundamental to consider the psychic depth of the *concrete* of the relationships we analyze, in which “both the particularity and universality of human existence are both produced and reified.” (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 465). I consider Lukács (1968) (*Verdinglichung*) as the more precise conception of reification for this psychoanalytic discussion, in *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. Studien über Marxistische Dialektik*. In this concept (with Marxist theory as a presupposition) reification in a relational context hinders its own essence: relationships between individuals. In fact, his consideration on the production of objects (which are a result of human labor, eventually perceived only as objects of exchange), analyzes the disintegrating effect that it has on the community.

«The unfamiliarity of the product of labor and the absence of choice in the producing act are, as Marx writes, the principal determinants of reification. They are determinant because of their function of depriving work of its sym-

bolic individual significance, and in this deprivation of sense that we find the ultimate cause for reification.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 390).

The western modern man, the *homo oeconomicus*, as Freud wrote, is even more conditioned by these factors, since we live in a society which has been sculpted through capitalistic ventures.

Exploring psychoanalysis with a new, unintended function broadens the scope and accuracy of psychoanalytic inquiry.

Montefoschi first theorizes intersubjective psychoanalysis in her book *L'Uno e L'Altro* (The One and the Other), in 1977. Here she uses philosophy and psychoanalytic theory to analyze the relational roles and relational patterns observed during her practice. From this comes a different view of the subject: it entails a detachment from one's own experiences and, through this, becoming a responsible subject of them. Consequently, it entails a different modality of relating to the other. This modality is expressed in the need for being in the relationship, and in the need of being in it freely. Being free in the relationship acquires the meaning of being in the relationship but without being dependent on the other's expectations. When an individual is a responsible subject of his own experiences (and in this way of his personal history), he is not a *sub-jectum* (passively submitted), but an individual with sense of agency, which not only has been able to withstand the anxiety arising from the breaking of dependence, but also has been able to introspect and inter-introspect in the relationship with the other. In the first relationship with the m/other, we learn the modality of relating of our social structure: interdependence. The ultimate task of the analytic relationship is also to enable individuals to achieve the intersubjective modality of relating.

¹ This concept forcefully bursts from the writings of Silvia Montefoschi, an almost unknown Italian psychoanalyst, especially in her book *L'Uno e L'Altro*.

² “Thoughtful psychoanalysts and other humanistic clinicians are practicing philosophers.” (Orange, 2010, p. 2) and Freud's words have to be kept in mind: “In a letter to Fliess, Freud was more and more interested in getting away from medicine and his interest in creating a new discipline led him to make use of philosophy – not to turn psychoanalysis into a philosophy, but rather use the questions the philosopher was asking.” (Abram, 2004, p. 17).

³ “Theories remain dependent on their philosophical underpinnings.” (Orange, 2010, p. 3)

«the child depends completely on his mother [...] becoming the exclusive object of the mother's interest [...] On the other hand, [...] the mother identifies the child as the only object of her need and considers herself as irreplaceable in its respects. From here love finds the language of need and its satisfaction as the only expression.»⁴ (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 102).

Although the importance of the mother-infant relationship has been recognized since the first psychoanalytic explorations, it is interesting to see that in Benjamin's overview of the intersubjective field of psychoanalysis there is a hint to this interdependence in the first relationship:

“The pathbreaking work of Stern [...] and [...] Beebe [...] have illuminated how crucial the relationship of mutual influence is for early self-development. They have also shown that self-regulation is achieved at this point through regulating the other [...] Mother's recognition is the basis for the baby's sense of agency. Equally important, although less emphasized, is the other side of this play interaction: the mother is dependent to some degree on the baby's recognition.” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 33-34).

Interdependence and the Division of Labor

«Instead of the independent man, we find everyone dependent, serfs and lords, vassals and suzerains, laymen and clergy. Personal dependence here characterizes the social relations of production just as much as it does the other spheres of life organized on the basis of that production.» (Marx, 1973, p. 5)

In Montefoschi's paradigm, interdependence plays a fundamental role. It seems that every relationship (and even the analytic one), starts as interdependent as our learned social way of relating. This interdependence occurs when an individual places on the other expectations and needs that are different from

the ones of the subject, as well as needing to satisfy the other's expectations.

This makes both of the relationship reciprocal objects of the other's need, where any kind of dialectic in the relationship is hindered. Given the difference between our needs and the needs of subjectivity, the relationship becomes based on the reciprocal satisfaction of needs: interdependence. In interdependence, one offers oneself as the object⁴ of the other's needs. This modality fixes the two in defined roles (active and passive, strong and weak, patient and physician). Each role is falsely attached to one of the two, in such a way that the analyst must appear the strong one, and the patient must appear weak, though very often this is not the case and the roles are interchangeable as a matter of fact. In these roles both offer themselves as objects of exchange. (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 86) This, as seen before, deprives work and (individuals) of [...] symbolic individual significance (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 390) and ultimately objectified into a metaphorical division of labor.

Origins of Interdependence

«Interdependence, which conceals intersubjectivity, presents itself as an affective expression of a socio-economic model of the relationship founded on the division of roles. Interdependence is in turn, fed by intersubjectivity, because it is the same subjectifying instance that obliges the two of the relationship to satisfy each-other's expectations and roles.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 50)

This excerpt also sheds light on the influences Karl Marx had on her view of social relations and the underlying cause of relational patterns, given by the objectifying approach towards the other (Marx, 1973, p. 4). The first instance that carries the interde-

⁴ And the purpose of the analytic process seems to be to break the interdependence produced by the division of roles: “dissolve the apparatus of framing, which always produces an object for a subject and a subject for an object” (Bryson, 1988, p. 100)

pendent relationship is the mother-infant relationship.

«In our social system the mother-infant relationship is the first exclusive relationship⁵ in which the human being places himself. In this relationship, being a *first relationship*, he learns the way of relating to the other and to himself, in it he expresses all of his needs, being an *exclusive* relationship.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 54)

Other than learning and conceiving his physiological needs and learning to relate in order to have his needs met, he also learns the needs for his being a subject. Here the child recognizes itself, as itself, and as different from the mother in the relationship with her.⁶ Keeping it in mind, the first tendency of the child is to satisfy the expectancies that the *m/other* has in him, in order to make the other stay in the relationship⁷.

⁵ “The tremendous power of the mother’s facial response and its role in shaping the sense of the self. However, this famous concept emphasizes the mother’s impact on the infant, matching or reflecting back the infant’s affective state, but it omits Winnicott’s (1974) equal appreciation for the role of the infant. The infant’s affective facial/visual responsiveness has a reciprocal power to affect the mother’s feeling of being recognized and loved by her baby (see Tronick, 1989).” (Beebe, 2004, p. 2).

Ernst Cassirer, regarding the role of the face in development, also writes: “by the second month the child knows his mother’s face; by the middle of the first year he reacts to a friendly or an angry face, and so differently that there is no doubt that what was given to him phenomenally was the friendly or angry face [...] We are left with the opinion that phenomena such as ‘friendliness’ or ‘unfriendliness’ are extremely primitive – even more primitive, for example, than that of a blue spot.” (Cassirer, 1957, p. 65).

⁶ As stated before by Montefoschi, the intersubjective relationship has two needs: the need of the other to be in the relationship, and the need to be free in the relationship.

⁷ “Freud himself observed the data that supports such a contextual theory of developmental psychopathology as a systems incompetence [...] whenever primeval attachments organize experience they retain their singular value in the protection they continue to afford against the ultimate danger from which there is no recovery -the loss of an object vital to existence.” (Brandchaft, 2010, p. 184) The emphasis on historical

In this first relationship, Montefoschi places an analysis of the socially-learned modality of relating to the other. This is also confirmed in her critique of previous theories that: “In the mother-infant relationship, psychoanalytic theories refuse to consider the dynamics of the social context in which the mother is, starting from her familial context.” (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 125). This modality is fully expressed in the mother-infant relationship, being the *topos* also for the social and economic dynamics seen in society. This view finds correspondence in her concept of “osmosis of the systems”⁸, borrowed from biology, in which all systems (man-system, family-system, etc.) follow the same dynamics.

The Division of Roles, an Echo of the Division of Labor

As Karl Marx writes in the *Fragment on Machines*, in the production process, objectified labor over-rules living labor, making it accessory to the production process (Marx, 1973, p. 693). Marx’s elaboration on the division of roles also coincides with Montefoschi’s reflections on the division of roles and on dependency: “The individual places his identity in his role” (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 50).

Marx examines what is an objective dependency of individuals (pertaining to the actual dependency which individuals had on one another) which, in turn, becomes a personal dependency, ruled by the abstractions of production relationships. This abstraction is a reification process of the individual, being a theoretical construct that expresses material relations (Marx, 1973, p. 102).

Reification is found in Marx’s reflections on this abstraction of the relations in the productive process. The philosopher analyzes the value of the individual, posed through his *exchange value*, *use value* and *no-value* (Marx,

contexts was also recognized in Freud. (Ibid.) He also defines this as ‘pathological accommodation’.

⁸ It is interesting to notice that this concept follows the same pattern as Georg Groddeck’s *Es*. (Groddeck, 1966.)

1973, p. 223). “The worker is thereby formally posited as a person who is something for himself apart from his labor, and who alienates his life” (Marx, 1973, p. 223).

This historical perspective of development has been concealed by Cartesian rationalism. Given its premise of a substantial isolated Ego, the means to historicize oneself in the context of one’s own experiences is Introspection⁹.

But this is still a Cartesian concept, since it considers the isolated mind as reflecting on itself. Intersubjectivity goes beyond the so-called “myth of the isolated mind” and includes introspection, but requiring a reflection on the relationship, an inter-introspection.

If human essence is discovered in the knowing process, the mode of being *Mensch*¹⁰ loses its limits and extends to the entire realm of experience in which man can recognize himself as a *subject* of experience.

If man’s experience of his own identity is seen as a *subject of the experience of knowing*, and not as an objective fact of self-knowledge, then the image that man acquires of himself is placed in his relational life, covering also a knowledge of the *socio-historical becoming* of the individual, an individual becoming placed as a term of reference to the totality of humanity, an expansion of the Jungian *Selbst*.¹¹ (Montefoschi, 1977,

p. 451). What is experienced in an intersubjective relationship is that *being with* the other (Ibid. 27) does not turn into dependence, reciprocal freedom is not precluded by our reciprocal expectancies, if in the relationship what is expected is only being there (*esserci*) and being there in freedom (Ibid.). The function of the *other*¹² to human beings is then to enable them to recognize themselves as existent, and experiencing the other as *other subject* in a relationship that achieves the actualization of his own subjectivity. *Being with* is then a reciprocal relationship in which a subject gives and receives, acts and suffers, without any other need than the presence of the other in the relationship.

A different view of the individual is already offered by Heidegger and Scheler, fundamental for this consideration:

«The person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an object. [...] What Scheler says of the person, he applies to acts as well: But an act is never also an object; for it is essential to the Being of acts that they are experienced only in their performance itself and given reflection.» (Heidegger, 1962, p. 73.)

Beatrice Beebe’s article *Faces*¹³ *in Relation: A Case Study*, carries many connotations that

⁹ Which Lacan analyzes in a way that coincides with Montefoschi’s consideration of being subject of one’s own life experiences: “That in which the consciousness may turn back upon itself – grasp itself, like Valérie Young Parque, *as seeing oneself seeing oneself*”, or in his more usual term: “*méconnaissance*”. From (Lacan, 1977, p. 74).

¹⁰ *Mensch* is taken from Erich Fromm, who in the Introduction of *Being or Having?* Poses the question of an un-gendered way of referring to an other. His intents are taken and included in this thesis, so the words that might seem gendered are not intended with that purpose.

¹¹ Considering the Jungian legacy for her thought, she writes that the particularity of Jung’s thought was his interpretational key, which enables other theorists to relativize his results and to go beyond them. Doing this, psychoanalysts remain “faithful to the spirit of his Weltanschauung, his individuation, which cannot conceive any dogma, not even the dogma of individuation.” (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 427)

¹² Also referenced in (Beebe, 2004, p. 2.): “Seeing and being seen carry many connotations, from Freud’s (1913) view that the therapist’s being seen dilutes the transference, to Sartre’s (1992) view that seeing and being seen can objectify the self and (the) other (see Eigen, 1993), to the view that being seen and responded to by the other is constitutive of the self (Winnicott, 1965; Bion, 1977; Kohut, 1977).”

¹³ A predecessor to what is explored in this article is offered in Winnicott. Reflecting on one of his patients, who had a very long analysis with him, he writes: “This patient has a marked absence of just that which characterizes so many young women, an interest in the face. She certainly had no adolescent phase of self-examination in the mirror [...] I feel sure that it was important that I knew this about the face, and that I could interpret the patient’s search for a face that could reflect herself, and at the same time see that, because of the lines, my face in the picture reproduced some of her mother’s rigidity.” (Winnicott, 1967, p. 4). Not only does the patient search for a reflection of herself in another face, but she also searches for a face

have been previously explored in psychoanalytic theory, but are now moving towards what has been defined as intersubjectivity. In contemporary psychoanalytic theory this change in the perspective of the other within the co-construction of the intersubjective field, is currently of great interest. (Beebe, 2004, p. 1).

Duranti's analysis of Husserl also sheds light on the phenomenological contextualization of intersubjectivity and its application to human experience, which can be placed in the therapeutic context:

«By exploring the role of the living human body, empathy, tools, and the natural and cultural world, Husserl comes to see intersubjectivity as a domain of inquiry that spans the entire scope of human experience.» (Duranti, 2010, pp. 1-2).

Montefoschi's theory is the first integration of the philosophical Husserlian concept of subject and intersubjectivity. What she considers is a *proposal for a phenomenology of the subject* (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 432) in the realm of psychoanalytic inquiry, modifying the purpose of the psychoanalytic process.

Being a psychoanalytic process, we can draw the socio-historical origins of her thought in previous theories. Etchegoyen's reading of Lacanian¹⁴ theories is a step towards this

that has meaning to her. A meaning that is symbolic of a relationship. Another predecessor, which goes back to the primordial and pre-verbal understanding is Cassirer. (Cassirer, 1957, p. 65).

¹⁴ The *Stade du Miroir* (Lacan, 1949) reflection of the patient on behalf of the analyst is fundamental to the dialectical view of psychoanalysis. Even if the concept proposed by Lacan would be objectifying in Montefoschi's view, the influence it has on the development of her theories (and of Winnicott's) goes unsaid. "The patient offers the thesis with his material, and faced with that material we have to accomplish a dialectical inversion, proposing an antithesis that confronts the analysand with the truth he is rejecting—which would be the latent material. This takes the process to a new development of the truth and the patient to a new thesis." (Etchegoyen, 1991, p. 117). It is also important to acknowledge the role this dialectic process has in Lacan's theories, in which the "transfere-

philosophical and analytical stance (Etchegoyen, 1991, p. 122). This is also implicitly proposed by Winnicott in *Mirror-role of Mother and Family in Child Development*. Winnicott, influenced by Lacan¹⁵, goes beyond the stage of the mirror, which results in an analysis of what precedes the mirror "*the precursor to the mirror is the mother's face*." (Winnicott, 1967, p. 1). He indicates a reciprocal relationship between mother and child "The mother is looking at the baby and *what she looks like is related to what she sees there*." (Ibid. 2), which already introduces what will later be an intersubjective view of the relationship. This reciprocal relationship is further specified

«The mother's face is not then a mirror [...] perception takes the place of that which might have been the beginning of a significant exchange with the world, a two-way process in which self-enrichment alternates with the discovery of meaning in the world of seen things.» (Ibid.).

Particular to Lacan (but Montefoschi specifies that Jung before him already wrote this) we can appreciate the *Moi* and *Je* the difference between a subject that is searching in and for itself, and an Ego that is given in social institutions; the difference between the "*subject of the pronunciation and the pronounced subject*" (*il soggetto dell'enunciazione e il soggetto dell'enunciato*). (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 449).

The Subject

«By achieving the point of view of the *subject*, a person achieves the ability to recognize inside himself the need to ful-

tial phenomenon arises if, for some reason, the dialectical process is interrupted." (Ibid.).

¹⁵ "Jacques Lacan's paper *Le Stade du Miroir* (1949) has certainly influenced me. He refers to the use of the mirror in each individual's ego development. However, Lacan does not think of the mirror in terms of the mother's face in the way I wish to do here." (Winnicott, 1967, p. 1)

fill the other's need, and, by not satisfying it, he can distance himself from the context in which he is placed. By not making the other the object of his own need anymore, he sees the other in itself, he recognizes him and recognizes in the external interlocutor the answer to the request which he had pushed forward, and answered already in himself. Finally, he can choose his behavior without depending on the other's expectation.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 90)

But what is a subject? One could be led in error by the etymology of "subject", *sub-jectum*, which recalls an undergoing, a submission, rather than a mastery of oneself. In Montefoschi's theoretical stance, though that mastery is not to be taken for granted, *the patient is active* in the sense that he becomes (or should become through analysis) responsible of his own history. Montefoschi theorizes a process of knowing in which the person is placed as a concrete subject of the knowing procedure. In her view, a subject is "not metaphysical anymore, since it is not placed *a priori* in respect to the knowing procedure, but it is recognized as becoming a subject during the procedure." (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 458).

The basic needs of the human being as subject are: relationship¹⁶ and freedom. This need of relationship pushes both of the participants to satisfy their mutual expectations (in order for the other will stay in the relationship), and also to expect the other to *free himself* (because it is that effort to free oneself that thwarts his being dependent) and in turn changes his way of relating to the other.

¹⁶ "In looking at faces he seems to me to be painfully striving towards being seen, which is at the basis for creative looking. I see that I am linking apperception with perception by postulating a historical process (in the individual) which depends on being seen." (Winnicott, 1967, p. 3). Winnicott's words are extremely interesting and relevant to what Montefoschi is writing when considering the prerequisites for being a subject. One of these prerequisites is the ability to see oneself as the subject of one's own history, and this can happen only in the context of relationships.

«The reciprocal expectation does not exclude freedom, on the contrary, wants it [...] [...] (after the realization of freedom in the relationship) In suffering one makes experience in himself of the other, in acting one projects himself in the other with what he has experimented of the other while suffering.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 86).

Furthermore, this intersubjective interaction leads to a universally genuine objectivity (*Wirklichkeit*) (of Husserlian derivation), which Montefoschi's paradigm confirms: the object (the reality between patient and analyst) shared by two subjects¹⁷ is a form "objectivity", *Wirklichkeit*¹⁸. This shared "objectivity" is, in clinical practice, embodied in interpretations¹⁹: this shared objectivity does not concern interpretations, which can be as inevitable as they are automatic, but it concerns the very *being with* in the relationship, a universal event.

«The object of psychoanalytic practice is the place in which the alienation occurs. It is in this way because psychoanalysis functions on the same affective ground where the socio-economic²⁰ relationships have their roots. This socio-economic relationship is where individ-

¹⁷ This shared interaction is also conceived in Duranti's reading of Husserl: "The presence of an Other to acts in which one actively works at making sure that the Other and the Self are perceptually, conceptually, and practically co-ordinated around a particular task." In (Duranti, 2010, p. 2).

¹⁸ A form of objectivity, given by phenomena, which are subjective. The more correct translation would be of a universal subjectivity. (Duranti, 2010).

¹⁹ "The interpretations of the analyst (which have value), are those that contain the dual relationship (*relazione duale*), and refer to the reciprocal movements of the analyst and the patient in the relationship. [...] Interpretation is the only non-arbitrary knowledge the analyst can have access to: his actions motivated by the actions of the other as a self-reflective and reflective act." (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 91).

²⁰ This is also implicitly considered in Lacan's thought on "*Your money or your life!*" (Lacan, 1977, p. 212). Also, the inclusion of politics and economics naturally stems from these considerations.

ual and social identity is constituted or hindered.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 465).

The Shared Object or Analytic Thirdness

So the relationship becomes the *topos* in which two subjects share an object. Jessica Benjamin, in *Beyond Doer and Done to: An Intersubjective View of Thirdness*²¹, writes of a similar theoretical construct.²² Although Benjamin's article is about thirdness, we must recognize the differences there are with Montefoschi's paradigm. In fact, Montefoschi is not a relationalist as intended by Meredith-Owen²³, her view of thirdness originates in the dyadic relationship, but maintains an object, that is shared amongst the two subjects of the relationship.

We share the same object, we both share a tension towards an object which frees us from ourselves and transforms us into human beings, through a philosophical act.

Intersubjectivity is also necessary, since "to live as a person is to live in a social framework, wherein I and we live together in a

community and have the community as a horizon." (Husserl, 1931, p. 150) Husserl's correlation between *I and we*²⁴, as a definition of living as a person perfectly coincides with that of being a subject. Duranti also elaborates on Husserl:

«intersubjectivity is, first, not a product or an effect of communication but a condition for its possibility.[...] intersubjectivity has come to be seen as something that must be achieved through particular activities including the use of language and other kinds of communicative resources.» (Duranti, 2010, p. 9).

The consideration of intersubjectivity as a condition for communication and as achievable through communication coincides with the "talking cure". This intersubjectivity is seen as a "new form of sociality [...] a new form of enduring society, whose spiritual life, cemented together by a common love of creation of ideas and by the setting of ideal norms of life, carries within itself a horizon of infinity for the future" (Husserl, 1931, p. 160). And with the furthering in this kind of relationship, at the achievement of a determinate truth or objective validity, this relationship stimulates the "production of higher-level idealities". (Husserl, 1931, p. 162).

Karl Marx

At present we can do nothing for the wider social strata, who suffer extremely seriously from the neuroses [...] the poor man should have just as much right to assistance for his mind as he now has to the life saving help offered by surgery [...] out-patient clinics will be started to which analytically trained physicians will be appointed. (Freud, 1955)

²¹ A first reflection of thirdness out of the dyadic relation is given by Lacan in his elaborations on the transference process in the concept of the *sujet suppose savoir*. "From this perspective the psychoanalytic process is only going to take shape once the analyst has transformed that dual relation into a symbolic one, for which it is necessary for him to break the dyadic relation and to occupy a third place" In (Etchegoyen, 1991, p. 127).

²² "Analytic work based on the intersubjective view of two participating subjectivities requires discipline rooted in an orientation to the structural conditions of thirdness. The author proposes a theory that includes an early form of thirdness involving union experiences and accommodation, called the *one in the third*, as well as later moral and symbolic forms of thirdness that introduce differentiation, the *third in the one*. Clinically, the concept of a co-created or shared intersubjective thirdness helps to elucidate the breakdown into the twoness of complementarity in impasses and enactments and suggests how recognition is restored through surrender." (Benjamin, 2004. Abstract).

²³ Meredith-Owen, W. (2013). Are Waves of Relational Assumptions Eroding Traditional Analysis? In *Journal of Analytical Psychology*. 58, 593–614

²⁴ Which also coincides with Beebe's (Beebe, 2004, p. 37) "I Feel on My Face the Feeling on Your Face". This concept also follows Lacan's theories, which in turn is Lacan's following of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.

A crucial philosopher to Montefoschi's view of the revolutionary purpose of psychoanalysis is Karl Marx.

«As the psychoanalytic anthropology emerges from the transformational analysis of neurosis, (as a parameter that is implied in it and guides its proceedings), so Marxist anthropology emerges from the analysis of alienation and from the adequate guide to its overcoming.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 457).

Starting from her considerations on Freud's thought²⁵, who "describes in the three phases of human development the psychological structure of the *homo oeconomicus*." (Ibid. 445). Marx is so integrated as one of the bases for her consideration of dual relationships (*relazioni duali*) for this *homo oeconomicus*²⁶, a man that exists in a social environment conditioned by financial factors as well as "underlines the importance of variations in the quantity of mental forces and of the relative strength of such forces (conceived as mental energies)." (Sandler et al. 1997, p. 31). She then analyzes those societal mechanisms that influence its creation and modes of existing: "the two of the affective dual relationship are interdependent for their own social survival" (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 49). Interdependence is an obstacle to the realization of intersubjectivity, but affectively

²⁵ Heavily criticized by Orange using Wittgenstein's philosophy: "Wittgenstein thought Freud, as we have seen, had reductionistically confused reasons with causes. Causes, the kinds of dynamic and economic ("quantities of psychic energy", for example) factors to which Freudian and Kleinian instinct theories attribute our "mental" life, are pushes and pulls, fully deterministic. Reasons, the sorts of accounts we give in conversation, have value for phenomenologists and for Wittgenstein, but were disparaged by Freud as defenses like denial and rationalization. What Freud failed to see, from this point of view, is that first-person experience could never be of causes, but only reasons. Causes [...] belong to a completely different language-game from that of meanings, reasons, and understanding." (Orange, 2010, p. 47)

²⁶ "Freud defined his theory of psychoanalysis as a metapsychology that synthesized three standpoints – the topographical, the dynamic, and the economic." (Abram, 2004, p. 19)

bounds people to a socio-economic relationship model, based on the division of roles (due to the socio-economic division of labor).

«Even in the natural standpoint, a man experiences his neighbors even when the latter are not at all present in the bodily sense. He finds himself surrounded by objects which tell him plainly that they were produced by other people; these are not only material objects but all kinds of linguistic and other sign systems, in short, artifacts in the broadest sense.» (Schutz, 1967, p. 109)

Marx's influence on her thought is made explicit when she writes on what she considers the fundamental problem of being human (both as neurotic symptoms or simply personality traits). For her this problem derives from the imprisonment of the individual in the role institutionalized by the social environment, which negates any new and possible existential experiences.

Relationships between individuals are ultimately modeled in the society they live in:

«There are no immediate social relations between people in their same jobs, but they are as material relationships among people and social relationships among things [...] Men compare with one another their talents (results of their work) as human talents, equating one with the other as values their heterogeneous products, in the act of exchanging.» (Marx, 1973, p. 4).

Marx's writings are extremely useful to understand the context in which Montefoschi was writing. In fact, in her view, psychoanalysis coincides with the purpose of Marx's anthropology: a revolutionary tool. She writes that "Marx sees, on an anthropological level, the overcoming of alienation in the restoring the value of *autonomous activity* (*attività autonoma*) to human life" (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 391). This autonomy also brings with it the consciousness of acting in the social environment.

Needing

Her integration of Marx's historical materialism in psychoanalysis results in the identification of the process of dialectic transformation, in which the healthy individual coincides with a healthy society, confirming her idea of the social function of psychoanalysis (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 465).

In her view, the entire concept of *having need*, as an experiential phenomenon, is not naturally determined, but relationally induced. This also follows from her reflections on the role of society on the relationship. Since relationships occur in the social environment, they are the place in which the satisfaction of the needs of biological and social survival are placed.

«With Marxian thought, the concept of need becomes explicitly relational. In Marx's anthropological conception, man himself, entering a productive relationship with nature in the context of a relationship with other people, creates specific social needs, 'relational needs'. These socio-cultural needs²⁷ are determined by history as the true human needs, while those strictly natural needs remain a pure abstraction.» (Montefoschi, 1977, p. 32)

Paradoxically what we call natural needs are always embedded in a socio-political structure. There occurs a naturalization of social needs, which hides the intersubjectivity as the *Ereignis* in which I am revealed to myself

²⁷ "die natürliche Einstellung, at first translated in English as 'the natural standpoint' (Husserl, 1931b) and then, later, as 'the natural attitude' (e.g. Husserl, 1998). This is a very anthropological notion that can be easily rendered as 'the cultural attitude', given that Husserl uses 'natural' in this case as meaning taken-for-granted rather than belonging to the world of nature (Duranti, 2009). One of the first philosophers to propose an 'anthropological' reading of Husserl was Enzo Paci, who, in writing in the 1960s, recognized Husserl's rejection of naturalism." (Duranti, 2010, p. 3).

through the other of the conversation. Being, then, is possible only in the *Ereignis*, the event of the relationship. Furthermore, the "abstraction" of natural or physical needs is supported also by Jaspers' reflection on the subjective appearance of nature, in which "Physical reality has become more and more alien." (Jaspers, 1986, p. 66)

For Freud, this alienating characteristic of needs is also reflected in the relationship with others "if an individual's need for love is not entirely satisfied in real life, his attitude will always be one of search, of awaiting, in relation to everyone he meets or finds." (Etchegoyen, 1991, p. 89). This reflection on needs is coherent with Montefoschi's concept of interdependence, in which there are reciprocal expectations and needs that are other from the needs of being social or historical subjects.

The concept of the fulfillment of needs in Montefoschi's paradigm acquires a new function, it becomes the basis for the transformation of relationships into *intersubjective* relationships. It serves also as the basis for the widespread modality of relating with the other: interdependence, which has intersubjectivity as its basis, and is the only channel through which intersubjectivity can be achieved.

Montefoschi's intersubjectivity²⁸ has a specific social and political task. It is not only a shared or mutual understanding, it is a particular way of doing this: it is a mutual understanding of two subjects, in which the definition of being a subject and the subject's

²⁸ "Despite the extensive references to Husserl in Merleau-Ponty's and Schutz's publications, the adoption of intersubjectivity by the majority of other scholars did not include a discussion, elaboration, or critique of Husserl's ideas. The outcome was that within one or two generations intersubjectivity came to be detached from Husserl's name and became understood in the restricted sense of 'shared' or 'mutual understanding' (Newson, 1978: 31; Rogoff, 1990; Rommetveit, 1974; Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005; Trevarthen, 1977; Trevarthen and Hubble, 1978). Jerome Bruner, for example, in boldly suggesting that psychology should be about intersubjectivity, defined it as 'how people come to know what others have in mind and how they adjust accordingly' (Bruner, 1996: 161)." (Duranti, 2010, p. 4).

needs are explored in depth. In this framework, no worker and no product can be reified. Not only is it Montefoschi's view, these perspectives should be pursued in all psychoanalysis, by practitioners who are not severed from their citizens and political subjects, as it was in the post-war period when clinics that served the lowest socio-economic stratus where opened "in a spirit of moral certainty and practical realism – the alleviation of poverty, ignorance, disease, unemployment and homelessness" (Cooper and Lousada, 2010, p. 6).

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